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KANSAS V. NEBRASKA &
COLORADO: KEEPING EQUITY
AFLOAT IN THE REPUBLICAN
RIVER DISPUTE
CHARLES PUNIA
I. INTRODUCTION
The trouble that sovereigns experience in apportioning scarce
resources among themselves has led to many disputes throughout
1
history. The Supreme Court has addressed this problem between the
2
States via its power to hear cases of original jurisdiction. Here, the
3
States may petition the Court directly, as the Court alone may
4
provide a remedy in cases involving disputes between them. In
5
Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado, the Court will consider a dispute
between Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado concerning the
apportionment of a scarce resource: the water from the Republican
6
River Basin.
The Court appointed a Special Master to make recommendations
7
in Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado. The Special Master found that
Nebraska used more than its share of water, but a mutual mistake in
the three states’ accounting procedures overstated some of
8
Nebraska’s use. Additionally, the Special Master found that Kansas

 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2016.
1. Charles M. Courtney, Casenote, Nebraska v. Wyoming and Colorado Allocating Water
Rights to Interstate Rivers: Equitable Principles and the Role of Substantial Injury, 3 DICK. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 89, 89 (1994).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to
Controversies between two or more States.”).
3. See, e.g., Kansas v. Nebraska, 131 S. Ct. 1847, 1847 (2011).
4. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (West 2014) (providing the Supreme Court with exclusive
jurisdiction over cases between sovereign states).
5. Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Original (U.S. argued Oct. 14, 2014).
6. Report of the Special Master at 1, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Original (U.S. Jan. 13,
2014) [hereinafter Fourth Report].
7. Kansas v. Nebraska, 131 S. Ct. at 1847.
8. Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 187.
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should receive monetary relief in the form of compensatory damages
9
and disgorgement, but not injunctive relief. The parties disputed
some of the Special Master’s recommendations and submitted their
exceptions to the Supreme Court. While Nebraska admitted to its
10
excess consumption of water, a question remains for the Court
regarding the exact amount of overuse and which remedy is
appropriate. The Court may decide to approve the Special Master’s
recommendations in full, it may adopt the exceptions argued by
Kansas, Nebraska, or Colorado, or it may fashion its own remedy.
Ultimately, the Court seeks a “fair and equitable solution” in cases
11
of original jurisdiction. Thus, the Court should approve the
recommendations of the Special Master who found that the
accounting procedure contained a mutual mistake and that monetary
damages, but not injunctive relief, are warranted. While the monetary
damages should include disgorgement, the Court should take a
second look at how to calculate disgorgement.
This comment will provide the factual and legal background
leading up to Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado and will analyze the
case’s key issues.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
The Republican River Basin is a watershed that incorporates parts
12
of Colorado, Nebraska, and Kansas. The Republican River originates
in Colorado, briefly passes through Kansas and then runs into
13
Nebraska. Finally, the river winds back into Kansas, eventually
14
becoming part of the Kansas River. In 1942, Kansas, Nebraska, and
Colorado entered negotiations with the goal of reaching a compact
concerning apportionment of the Republican River water between
15
the three states. Compacts of this sort became common, as new
9. Id. at 179.
10. Nebraska’s Exceptions & Brief in Support at 2, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Original
(U.S. Feb. 27, 2014).
11. See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 134 (1987) (stating that the Court has come up
with what it believes to be a “fair and equitable solution”).
12. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Overruling the Parties’
Exceptions to the Report of the Special Master at 3, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Original
(U.S. Apr. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Brief of the United States].
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 4.
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technologies developed which allowed upriver states to use immense
16
amounts of water to the detriment of downriver states.
In light of these technological developments’ effect on water use,
Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado ratified the Republican River
17
Compact (the Compact) in 1943, and Congress enacteded it that
18
same year. The Compact allocates the rights to use the Republican
19
River Basin’s water supply between the three states. Going even
further, “[t]he Compact quantifies the Republican River Basin’s
‘Virgin Water Supply,’ which is defined as ‘the water supply within the
20
Basin undepleted by the activities of man.’” Specifically, the
Compact allocates 54,100 acre-feet per year to Colorado; 234,500
acre-feet per year to Nebraska; and 190,300 acre-feet per year to
Kansas, plus any water originating entirely within Kansas after the
21
river’s last intersection with Nebraska. Finally, pursuant to the
Compact, the states created the Republican River Compact
Administration (RRCA), which is charged with computing each
22
state’s usage at yearend.
23
Trouble arose in the 1980s and 1990s. Nebraska increased its
groundwater pumping, which had the effect of depleting water in the
24
river basin. Kansas alleged that groundwater pumping constituted
25
part of each state’s water share under the Compact. Nebraska
26
disagreed. The states resolved this issue at the start of the current
litigation by adopting Kansas’s stance in the Final Settlement
27
Stipulation (FSS).
The FSS, agreed to by Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado, expressly
states that it did “not intend[] to . . . change the States’ respective
28
rights and obligations under the Compact,” but rather addressed
16. Aaron M. Popelka, The Republican River Dispute: An Analysis of the Parties’ Compact
Interpretation and Final Settlement Stipulation, 83 NEB. L. REV. 596, 597–98 (2004).
17. Brief of the United States, supra note 12, at 4 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 37-67-101
et seq. (West 2010); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-518 (West 1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. app. § 1-106 (2008)).
18. Id. (citing Act of May 26, 1943, ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86).
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing Art. II, 57 Stat. 87).
21. Id. at 5 (citing Art. II, 57 Stat. 88).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 6.
24. Id.
25. Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 5.
26. Id.
27. Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 6.
28. Final Settlement Stipulation vol. 1 at 2, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Original (U.S.
Apr. 16, 2003).
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29

accounting procedures for determining compliance. In a dry year,
such as 2006, the accounting procedures determine whether a state
used more than its water allocation by averaging the state’s use for
30
that year and the prior one. Nebraska used more water than
allocated in both 2005 and 2006, and therefore breached the Compact
31
in 2006. The accounting procedures as written, however, do not
distinguish between imported water, which originates outside the
Republican River Basin, and virgin water, which originates inside the
32
basin. This treatment has the effect of over-calculating a state’s water
usage when it imports more water relative to its fellow states.
B. Procedural History
The present action commenced on January 19, 1999 when the
Supreme Court, under its original jurisdiction, granted Kansas’s
33
motion for leave to file a bill of complaint. The Court ordered the
appointment of the Honorable Vincent L. McKusick as Special
34
Master. Pursuant to this appointment, the Court gave Mr. McKusick
35
the authority to direct further proceedings and generate reports.
36
The Court received and filed Mr. McKusick’s first report in 2000.
This first report sided with Kansas, finding that the Compact
37
encompassed groundwater pumping. The Court then invited all
38
parties to file “Exceptions to the Report.” Subsequently, the Court
39
sent the case back to Mr. McKusick for additional proceedings. The
parties then discussed settlement, ultimately coming to agreeable

29. See Final Report of the Special Master with Certificate of Adoption of RRCA
Groundwater Model at 1, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Original (U.S. Sept. 23, 2003) (“The FSS
laid out the parameters for RRCA Groundwater Model which would, for use in the accounting
formulas for administering the Republican River Compact, determine . . . stream flow
depletions.”) [hereinafter Third Report].
30. Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 17.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 15.
33. Kansas v. Nebraska, 525 U.S. 1101, 1101 (1999).
34. Kansas v. Nebraska, 528 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1999).
35. See id. (granting the Special Master “the authority to fix the time and conditions for
the filing of additional pleadings and to direct subsequent proceedings, and with authority to
summon witnesses, issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be introduced . . . [and] to
submit such reports as he may deem appropriate”).
36. Kansas v. Nebraska, 528 U.S. 1151, 1151 (2000).
37. First Report of the Special Master at 23, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Original (U.S.
Feb. 22, 2000) [hereinafter First Report].
38. Kansas v. Nebraska, 528 U.S. at 1151.
39. Kansas v. Nebraska, 530 U.S. 1272, 1272 (2000).
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40

terms through execution of the FSS. In the interim, the Court
received and filed Mr. McKusick’s second report and approved the
41
executed FSS. Thereafter, in 2003, the Court filed a third report
42
approving the RRCA Groundwater Model, and discharged Mr.
McKusick from his duties as Special Master.
Unfortunately the states’ amicable relations did not last, and the
dispute rematerialized. Kansas contended that Nebraska overused its
share of water in the period since the FSS, leading to a breach of the
43
Compact in 2006. Kansas exhausted its non-litigious commitments
by submitting the issues before the RRCA and to non-binding
44
arbitration, but to no avail. Thereafter, the Court granted Kansas’s
45
motion for leave to file a petition in April 2011. The Court appointed
Mr. William J. Kayatta (now Judge Kayatta) as the new Special
46
Master to direct further proceedings and generate reports.
Accordingly, the Special Master conducted proceedings, during the
course of which Nebraska contended that its breach was not as severe
as Kansas had indicated. Nebraska argued that the RRCA’s
accounting erred by including “imported water” from other river
basins and, instead, should have only included “virgin water” from
47
within the Republican River Basin. Thus, Nebraska sought an
alteration to the accounting procedures based on a mutual mistake in
48
its execution.
After hearing both sides’ arguments, the Special Master produced
49
a report (the Fourth Report). The Court received and filed the
Fourth Report in January 2014, and again invited the parties to submit
50
briefs regarding their exceptions to the report. Subsequently, the
51
Court set oral arguments to hear each party’s exceptions, and to

40. Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 6.
41. Kansas v. Nebraska, 538 U.S. 720, 720 (2003).
42. Kansas v. Nebraska, 540 U.S. 964, 964 (2003); see id. (ordering the Special Master to
file another report that “certif[ies] adoption of the RRCA Groundwater Model.”).
43. Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 9.
44. Brief of the United States, supra note 12, at 8–9.
45. Kansas v. Nebraska, 131 S. Ct. 1847, 1847 (2011).
46. See id. (granting the Special Master the “authority to fix the time and conditions for
the filing of additional pleadings, to direct subsequent proceedings, to summon witnesses, to
issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be introduced . . . [and] to submit Reports as he
may deem appropriate.”).
47. Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 15.
48. Id.
49. See Fourth Report, supra note 6.
50. Kansas v. Nebraska, 134 S. Ct. 981, 981 (2014).
51. Kansas v. Nebraska, 134 S. Ct. 2744, 2744 (2014).
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determine whether there was a mutual mistake in the FSS’s execution
and which remedies Kansas should be afforded for Nebraska’s
breach.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Article III of the United States Constitution grants the Supreme
Court “judicial power” over “controversies between two or more
52
States.” The States, by ratifying the Constitution, gave the Court the
53
power to resolve disputes arising between them. In fact, the Supreme
Court maintains “original and exclusive jurisdiction of all
54
controversies between two or more States.” In cases of original
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court alone may provide remedies, which
55
are generally “equitable in nature.”
In cases of original jurisdiction, it is common for the Court to
56
appoint a Special Master to coordinate the proceedings. Once a
Special Master has been appointed, the Court affords “the Master’s
57
findings . . . respect and a tacit presumption of correctness.” The
Court, however, must review the record and reports of any Special
58
59
Master they appoint and make the ultimate decision.
Through appointment of Special Masters, the Court has previously
60
addressed disputes between states and, specifically, disputes in which
61
states had agreed upon a compact concerning water rights. The
Court has declared that “a compact when approved by Congress
62
becomes a law of the United States.” Nevertheless, the compact at its
63
heart remains a contract.
52. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
53. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987) (citing Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
37 U.S. 657, 672 (1838)).
54. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (West 2014).
55. Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. 641, 648 (1973) (citing Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 39
U.S. 210 (1840)).
56. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 734 (1981).
57. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 317 (1984).
58. See United States v. Maine, 469 U.S. 504, 506 (1985).
59. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. at 317.
60. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 364 (1976); Vermont v. New York,
417 U.S. 270, 270 (1974); Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. at 643; Wisconsin v. Michigan, 295 U.S.
455, 457, 460 (1935).
61. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86, 90–91 (2004); Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S.
124, 126–27 (1987).
62. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 128 (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564
(1983)).
63. Id. (quoting Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275, 285 (1959)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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64

While the Court may provide equitable remedies, it does so
65
within the confines of contract law. Thus, the compact “must be
66
construed and applied in accordance with its terms.” Where a
contract’s terms indicate that one party has breached, and the
contract itself specifies the appropriate remedy, then the Court should
67
afford that remedy. Conversely, the Court will go as far as to “reform
a written contract, where, owing to mutual mistake, the language used
therein did not fully or accurately express the agreement and
68
intention of the parties.” In cases of original jurisdiction, the Court
can fashion any remedy, including reformation, to reach a “fair and
69
equitable solution.” The party seeking relief, however, must show
“proof of mutual mistake . . . ‘of the clearest and most satisfactory
70
character.’”
The Court can provide a wide variety of remedies to reach an
equitable solution, especially because it has never directly spoken
about which damages are most appropriate in cases concerning water71
use compacts. For example, the Court can order monetary damages,
72
as it has done in previous cases concerning compacts between states.
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, which
73
normally bars suits against states without their consent, does not bar
the Court from providing a remedy for one state’s suit against
74
another. In fact, the Court may enter money judgments against
75
states despite not having the authority to enforce such judgments.
76
Regardless, states will “almost invariably” comply.

64. Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. at 648 (citing Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 39 U.S. 210
(1840)).
65. See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 129.
66. Id. at 128 (citing West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951)).
67. Id. at 129 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) cmt. b (1981)).
68. Philippine Sugar Estates Dev. Co. v. Philippine Islands, 247 U.S. 385, 389 (1918).
69. See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 134 (supplying an additional enforcement
mechanism in order to enforce a compact).
70. Philippine Sugar, 247 U.S. at 391 (quoting Snell v. Ins. Co., 98 U.S. 85, 89–90 (1878)).
71. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 130 (citing South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S.
286 (1904)).
72. See, e.g., id. at 132 (1987); Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 589 (1918).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
74. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 130 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 745
n.21 (1981)).
75. Id. at 130–31.
76. Id. at 131 (citing Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. at 592).

PUNIA 11.18.14 FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

8

11/28/2014 3:58 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 10

77

The Court may also award non-monetary relief. For instance, the
78
Court has considered awarding damages in the form of actual water.
Alternatively, the Court can award injunctive relief, which it has done
79
in the form of a decree, and by appointing a “River Master,” who
80
acts as a mediator between the states. An injunction, however, is
81
typically meant to serve a deterrent function. An injunction does not
82
issue by default; before providing injunctive relief the Court should
find that intervention is necessary to protect rights from an
83
irremediable threat.
IV. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER
Mr. Kayatta, as Special Master, made a myriad of
recommendations in the Fourth Report. Many of those
recommendations relate to one of two issues: (1) whether a mutual
mistake persists within the RRCA Accounting Procedures as to the
treatment of imported water, so that the Court may reform its
84
language; and (2) which remedy should be afforded to Kansas.
Because Nebraska concedes it failed to comply with the FSS “and
85
thereby breached its obligations under the Compact in 2006,” all
parties agree that some remedy is justified. As a result, the second
issue only concerns which remedy is appropriate.
A. Reformation
The Special Master agreed with Nebraska and Colorado’s
contentions that the accounting procedures’ treatment of imported
water consumption diverged from “the parties’ shared intent in
agreeing to the Accounting Procedures, and to the Compact,” and
86
therefore constituted a mutual mistake.
Imported water
consumption is not distinguished from virgin water consumption in

77. See id. at 129–30 (discussing option to award damages in the form of actual water).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 133.
80. Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86, 92 (2004) (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at
134–35; New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995, 1002–04 (1954)).
81. Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
82. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311 (1982) (quoting Harrisonville v.
W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337–38 (1933)).
83. Id. at 312 (quoting Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919)).
84. Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 14.
85. Id. at 87.
86. Id. at 22–23.

PUNIA 11.18.14 FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

11/28/2014 3:58 PM

KANSAS V. NEBRASKA & COLORADO: KEEPING EQUITY AFLOAT

9

87

the RRCA Accounting Procedures. This accounting applied to
88
roughly 8,000 acre-feet of water in 2006, which distorted water-use
calculations because a riverbed may have no virgin water in it, but
89
may yet run flush with imported water.
The Special Master cited multiple sources indicating that the
original intent of the parties was to exclude imported water as part of
the calculations of water consumption. First, the Special Master noted
that the Compact declares that it concerns water “‘originating in’ the
90
Republican River Basin.” Additionally, the Compact goes on to
declare that “allocations . . . are derived from the computed average
annual virgin water supply originating in” the Republican River
91
Basin. Further, the Special Master pointed to language in the FSS
declaring that “Beneficial Consumptive Use of Imported Water
Supply shall not count as Computed Beneficial Consumptive Use or
92
Virgin Water Supply.” Lastly, the Special Master cited language from
an earlier report, finding that the FSS “resolves this issue by providing
that beneficial consumptive use of imported water will not count as
93
computed beneficial consumptive use or as virgin water supply.”
Notably, Kansas indirectly benefits from the current accounting
procedure, as the procedure does not distinguish Nebraska’s use of
94
imported water, which instead counts towards its virgin-water share.
Despite the plain language cited above, Kansas argues that the
95
burden of proving a mutual mistake falls on Nebraska, and that
96
Nebraska has not met its burden. While the Special Master credited
Kansas’s statement of the law, he believes that enough evidence exists
to prove that the parties did not intend to treat imported water the
97
same as virgin water. The Special Master acknowledged that the

87. Id. at 15.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 34.
90. Id. at 23 (quoting Appendices to Report of the Special Master at B4–B5, Kansas v.
Nebraska, No. 126, Original (U.S. Nov. 15, 2013)).
91. Appendices to Report of the Special Master at B4, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126,
Original (U.S. Nov. 15, 2013) [hereinafter Appendices to the Report].
92. Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 24 (quoting Final Settlement Stipulation vol. 1, supra
note 28, at 25).
93. Id. at 25 (quoting Second Report of the Special Master at 64, Kansas v. Nebraska, No.
126, Original (U.S. Apr. 16, 2003)).
94. Id. at 35.
95. Id. at 27.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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Court has never reformed a compact. He noted, however, that the
accounting procedures fall within the FSS, which is unlike a compact
and more like a contract because it does not require approval by
99
Congress. Only agreements between states that alter their respective
rights require congressional approval, whereas the FSS does not alter
any of the parties’ rights: it merely provides means to calculate and
100
remedy a breach. The Special Master pointed to a similar scenario
101
from Wisconsin v. Michigan. In that case, the Court passed a decree,
including certain agreed-upon language defining the boundary
102
between two states. The language, however, contained certain
103
mutual mistakes. As a result, the Court declared that the language
104
should be altered.
B. Remedy
The Special Master noted that the Compact does not indicate the
105
proper remedy for breach. Thus, the Court may impose any remedy
106
that it considers a “fair and equitable solution.” The Court is free to
107
assess damages in the form of money rather than water. All three
108
states have indicated a preference for monetary damages.
1. Disgorgement
In addition to compensatory damages, Kansas seeks damages that
take into account its loss and Nebraska’s gain from the latter’s
109
overuse of water. The Special Master justified awarding these types
of damages on two bases. First, the Compact outlines each state’s
110
water rights. Water rights mirror property rights, which may be
subjected to disgorgement damages where those rights are
111
infringed. Following this reasoning, “one might fairly say that

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 38.
Id. at 41.
Id at 41–42.
Id.; Wisconsin v. Michigan, 295 U.S. 455 (1935).
Wisconsin v. Michigan, 295 U.S. at 458, 460.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 462.
Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 127.
Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 134 (1987).
Id. at 130.
Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 129.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 131.
Id.
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112

Nebraska took Kansas’ water.” Thus, the Special Master argued that
Nebraska’s taking should be subject to disgorgement damages.
Second, the Special Master found that the Compact is ultimately
113
an act of Congress, and thus a law of the United States. Where
United States law is broken, damages may be “aimed at divesting the
114
wrongdoer of any gains derived from the statutory violation.”
Under this reasoning disgorgement may also be appropriate.
Ultimately, while the Special Master acknowledged that contract law
115
affords some policy reasons for promoting efficient breach, he finds
that Nebraska’s gain from breach of the Compact far exceeded
116
Kansas’s loss. Therefore, the Special Master supported an award of
117
some disgorgement damages.
The Special Master recommended a disgorgement award despite
declaring that Nebraska did not deliberately breach the terms of the
118
Compact. Ultimately, the Special Master set the total damages owed
119
by Nebraska to Kansas at $5.5 million. This amount constitutes $3.7
120
million for compensatory damages
and $1.8 million for
121
disgorgement damages.
2. Injunctive Relief
Kansas also seeks injunctive relief in addition to monetary
122
damages. The Special Master recognized that an injunction is
123
necessary only “in order ‘to prevent future violations,’” particularly
124
because injunctions are meant to serve a deterrent function. While
Kansas remains skeptical of Nebraska’s willingness to comply with
125
the Compact going forward, the Special Master recognized that
Nebraska’s latest Implementation Management Programs have
reduced its groundwater pumping by 25 percent from when the

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 132.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 132–33.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 180–81 (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)).
Id.at 181 (citing Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)).
Id. at 183.
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126

settlement was reached.
Thus, Nebraska has fallen below its
consumption allocation by an average of approximately 64,000 acre127
feet per year in the five years following the 2006 breach. Because of
Nebraska’s turnaround, the Special Master rejected Kansas’s request
128
for an injunction or appointment of a River Master. Concerning the
latter request, the Special Master noted the Court has only resorted to
appointment of a River Master twice: where cooperation among the
states was unlikely and where the River Master filled a ministerial
129
role. Here, however, the Special Master found future disputes, if any,
130
would “require discretionary, policy-oriented decisionmaking” and
131
appointment of a River Master would be inappropriate.
V. ARGUMENTS
A. Kansas’s Arguments
Kansas takes exception to many of the Special Master’s
recommendations. Kansas maintains that there was no mutual
132
mistake that justifies reformation of the accounting procedures.
Kansas also contests the Special Master’s denial of injunctive relief, as
well as his endorsement of only $1.8 million in disgorgement
133
damages.
Kansas counters the Special Master’s finding that the FSS
contained a mutual mistake, pointing to the fact that the FSS was “an
134
extensive and technically detailed compromise.” As Kansas puts it,
“the parties got what they bargained for in 2002; there was no mutual
135
mistake.” In fact, Kansas contends that the parties “made a
deliberate choice” not to separate imported water as part of the
136
accounting procedures. Kansas specifically emphasizes that one of
Colorado’s experts explicitly recognized the non-linearity of the

126. Id. at 114.
127. Id. at 116.
128. Id. at 184.
129. Id. (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 134 (1987)).
130. Id. at 186 (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86, 92 (2004)).
131. Id.
132. Exceptions by Plaintiff State of Kansas to the Report of the Special Master and Brief
in Support of Exceptions at i, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Original (U.S. Feb. 27, 2014)
[hereinafter Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Exceptions].
133. Id.
134. Id. at 6.
135. Id. at 17.
136. Id. at 8.
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137

accounting system during negotiations.
Kansas further argues that Nebraska has not met the immense
138
burden of proving mutual mistake. Kansas stresses that “[t]he
139
mistake must be common and mutual to both parties” and proven
140
by “clear and convincing evidence.” Additionally, Kansas notes that
reforming a contract based on mutual mistake constitutes an
141
“extraordinary equitable remedy.”
Kansas also questions the Special Master’s conclusion regarding
whether FSS’s accounting procedures were the “best possible method
for addressing groundwater consumption based on present-day
142
understandings.” Kansas alleges that the Special Master found
143
mutual mistake by the mere existence of a better accounting system.
Kansas argues that the existence of a more efficient system does not
necessarily mean the parties made a mistake in their particular choice
144
of which system to use, and that Nebraska has failed to put forth
145
Kansas further contends that
evidence to prove otherwise.
Nebraska, to prove mutual mistake, has to show what the parties
146
intended to agreed upon. Otherwise, as here, alteration may do
more than fix inadvertent error, and may instead change the entire
147
method by which states address their apportionment of water.
Kansas further disputes the Special Master’s recommended
remedies. Kansas contends that injunctive relief is appropriate.
Particularly, Kansas emphasizes that “the Court may order ‘such
148
appropriate decree as the facts might be found to justify.’” Kansas
posits that the balance of equities warrants injunctive relief because
149
Nebraska has consistently breached the Compact. Kansas claims
150
that it suffers irreparable harm when Nebraska breaches, and a
137. Id. at 27.
138. Id. at 19.
139. Id. (quoting Hearne v. Marine Ins. Co., 87 U.S. 488, 490–91 (1874)).
140. Id. at 29. (citing Nash Finch Co. v. Rubloff Hastings, LLC, 341 F.3d
846, 850 (8th Cir. 2003)).
141. Id. at 19 (quoting Mark Andy, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 229 F.3d 710, 716 (8th Cir.
2000)).
142. Id. at 22.
143. Id. at 23.
144. Id. at 22–23.
145. Id. at 29.
146. Id. at 29–30 (citing Loewenson v. London Mkt. Cos., 351 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2003)).
147. Id. at 32.
148. Id. at 35 (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 145 (1902)).
149. Id. at 37.
150. Id. at 38.
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compliance order will not impede Nebraska as long as it complies.
Kansas also expresses concern that future breaches on Nebraska’s
152
part will require return trips to the Supreme Court.
Finally, Kansas takes exception to the Special Master’s award of
$1.8 million in disgorgement damages, arguing that it is too small.
Kansas points to the Special Master’s admission that Nebraska gained
153
upwards of $25 million for its overuse. Kansas argues that an award
of merely $1.8 million in disgorgement will fail in its deterrent
154
function, as a disgorgement of only $1.8 million, compared to
Nebraska’s $25 million gain, may incentivize future breach.
B. Nebraska’s Arguments
Nebraska principally takes exception to the $1.8 million
disgorgement award. First, Nebraska notes that the Special Master
admitted that a disgorgement award in this context is
155
“unprecedented.” Nebraska emphasizes a “Compact is, after all, a
156
contract.” As a result, it argues that no damages are available
beyond what is generally awarded in contract law: compensation
157
damages.
Nebraska further contests the Special Master’s basis in property
rights for awarding disgorgement. Nebraska highlights that it only
158
infringed Kansas’s water rights temporarily, not in perpituity.
Consequently, Nebraska claims any disgorgement is warranted only to
the extent required to return Kansas to the position it otherwise
159
would have occupied.
Further, Nebraska contends that
disgorgement would not serve a deterrent function, because, as the
Special Master admitted, “Nebraska’s Integrated Management
Plans . . . and actions to be taken thereunder alleviate any concerns
160
about future violations.”

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 39.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 53.
Nebraska’s Exceptions and Brief in Support, supra note 10, at 9.
Id. at 10 (quoting Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm’n., 359 U.S. 275, 285 (1959)).
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344, cmt. e).
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 14 (citing Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 116–27).
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Nebraska also asserts that disgorgement requires “intentional
161
interference with legal entitlements,”
so disgorgement is not
warranted here where interference was not intentional. Nebraska
remarks that the Republican River Basin experienced “an
unprecedented drought” in the years in which it consumed above its
162
allocation, leading to its greater reliance on the basin’s water.
Further, Nebraska contends that it began its Implementation
Management Programs to reduce groundwater pumping as early as
163
2004. These actions resulted in roughly a 36 percent reduction in
164
groundwater pumping between 2002 and 2006. Because of the
drought and Nebraska’s mitigation efforts, Nebraska argues that it
“did not ‘knowingly’ violate the Compact” and thus disgorgement is
165
inappropriate.
C. Colorado’s Arguments
Colorado’s exceptions to the Fourth Report largely echo the
exceptions taken by its fellow defendant, Nebraska. Like Nebraska,
Colorado argues disgorgement is unwarranted, mirroring Nebraska’s
contention that an unprecedented drought impeded Nebraska’s
166
otherwise “sincere efforts to reduce its allocation.”
To aid its argument, Colorado points to another case in which the
Special Master denied Kansas’s request for disgorgement because the
167
168
breach of a compact “was not intentional.” In Kansas v. Colorado,
169
Kansas sought disgorgement from Colorado for its overuse of water
from the Arkansas River, contrary to the terms of a compact between
170
the states. The Special Master in that case recommended no
disgorgement award, based on Colorado’s lack of intent to violate the

161. Nebraska’s Brief in Reply to Exceptions by Kansas at 32, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126,
Original (U.S. Mar. 31, 2014).
162. Nebraska’s Exceptions and Brief in Support, supra note 10, at 17.
163. Id.
164. See Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 111 (reporting that Nebraska’s ground water
pumping fell from more than 1,400,000 acre-feet in 2002 to less than 900,000 acre-feet in 2006).
165. Nebraska’s Exceptions and Brief in Support, supra note 10, at 16.
166. Colorado’s Sur-Reply in Support of its Exception at 7, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126,
Original. (U.S. Apr. 30, 2014).
167. Colorado’s Exception to the Report of the Special Master and Brief in Support of
Exception at 4, Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Original. (U.S. Feb. 27, 2014) [hereinafter
Colorado’s Exception and Brief in Support].
168. Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1999).
169. Third Report, supra note 29, at 75.
170. Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. at 679–80.
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compact. Colorado points out that, similar to the Special Master in
Kansas v. Colorado, the Special Master here has stated that Nebraska
172
did not intend to breach. Instead, Nebraska inadvertently breached
173
after honest attempts to comply. While Colorado concedes that the
Court did not directly address the disgorgement issue in Kansas v.
Colorado, the Court did accept the Special Master’s
174
recommendations twice. Colorado contends that the Court should
175
not award disgorgement here.
Additionally, Colorado argues that the Special Master’s $1.8
176
million disgorgement award “would result in a windfall to Kansas.”
Colorado emphasizes that while the Court sits with equitable power,
177
its ultimate remedy must not be arbitrary or capricious. Colorado
argues the Special Master failed to determine Nebraska’s actual gains
from its overuse, and $1.8 million in disgorgement does not relate to
178
Kansas’s loss. As a result, Colorado asserts that this $1.8 million
179
disgorgement would be arbitrary.
Finally, Colorado proclaims its support for the Special Master’s
denial of injunctive relief to Kansas. Colorado argues against Kansas’s
justification that any future breach will require return trips to the
180
Supreme Court. Colorado points to the FSS’s requirement that the
181
RRCA first hear disputes between the parties, and thereafter the
182
parties must additionally submit to arbitration. Both of these
forums may provide redress before the Supreme Court would be
bothered.

171. Third Report, supra note 29, at 80 (citing First Report, supra note 37, at 169).
172. Colorado’s Exception and Brief in Support, supra note 167, at 6 (citing Fourth Report,
supra note 6, at 111).
173. Id. (citing Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 130–31).
174. Id. at 8 (citing Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 6 (2001), and Kansas v. Colorado, 522
U.S. 1073 (1998)).
175. Colorado’s Sur-Reply in Support of its Exception at, supra note 166, at 7.
176. Id. at 9.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 10.
179. Id.
180. Colorado’s Reply in Opposition to Kansas’s Exceptions at 11, Kansas v. Nebraska, No.
126, Original (U.S. Mar. 31, 2014) (citing Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Exceptions, supra note
132, at 43).
181. Colorado’s Exception and Brief in Support, supra note 167, at 12 (citing Final
Settlement Stipulation vol. 1, supra note 28, at 34–35).
182. Id. (citing Final Settlement Stipulation vol. 1, supra note 28, at 39).
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D. The United States’s Position
While the United States is not a party to the case, the Court has
183
invited the United States to express its opinion in an amicus brief.
The United States supports approval of the Special Master’s Report
184
in its entirety.
VI. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court will now have to decide whether to approve
the recommendations issued by the Special Master, support any of the
state’s exceptions, or fashion its own equitable remedy. While the
Court has previously set aside some of its Special Masters’
185
recommendations, many prior cases also approve Special Master
186
recommendations, indicating a tendency towards deference. The
Court may also be influenced by the opinion of the United States,
187
which fully supports the Special Master’s recommendations.
Nebraska and Colorado’s position in opposition to Kansas’s
exceptions, echoing the positions of the Special Master and United
States, better draw upon the facts and settled law than do Kansas’s
exceptions. The current accounting system as propagated by the FSS
188
counts imported water towards each state’s consumption. Kansas
asserts that this treatment was intentional, and therefore the FSS
189
contained no mutual mistake. The plain language of both the
Compact and the FSS, however, indicate otherwise. Both documents
clearly state that the Republican River allocation considers only
190
virgin water supply. The FSS specifically excludes imported water
191
from calculations.

183. Kansas v. Nebraska, 131 S. Ct. 378, 378 (2010).
184. Brief of the United States, supra note 12, at 2.
185. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86, 96 (2004) (setting aside part of a Special
Master’s recommendations).
186. See, e.g., id. at 91–92, 102–05; Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 127–28 (1987).
187. Brief of the United States, supra note 12, at 2.
188. Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 15.
189. Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Exceptions, supra note 132, at i.
190. Appendices to the Report, supra note 91, at B4–B5; Final Settlement Stipulation vol. 1,
supra note 28, at 25.
191. See Appendices to the Report, supra note 91, at B4–B5 (“Beneficial Consumptive Use
of Imported Water shall not count as Computed Beneficial Consumptive Use or Virgin Water
Supply.”).
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Because the Compact is an act of Congress, the Court will
193
interpret it by first looking to its language. With such clear language,
the Court will not be persuaded by Kansas’s contentions that the
current accounting treatment was a point of bargain. The intent of the
parties is frustrated by the accounting procedure’s inadvertent
treatment of imported water. The language of the Compact supports
that the agreement is limited to virgin water; an accounting treatment
that includes imported water must have been a mistake. Therefore,
the Court should reform the FSS’s accounting procedures to better
reflect the parties’ intent and remedy the mutual mistake.
The Court would create an injustice for Nebraska by strictly
interpreting the accounting procedures as written. The current
accounting procedures distort the allocation in its inclusion of
194
imported water by charging Nebraska for virgin water that it does
195
not use. The Court, however, seeks a fair and equitable solution. An
equitable solution would not charge Nebraska for water it does not
196
use, particularly when a more accurate system is within reason.
Additionally, the Special Master offered convincing arguments for
denying the injunctive relief sought by Kansas. Injunctive relief is
197
meant to serve a deterrent function. To obtain injunctive relief
Kansas must convince the Court that its rights are severely
198
threatened. Kansas has not met this burden. While Nebraska
199
concedes its violation in 2006, the Special Master presented ample
200
evidence concerning its compliance in every year since.
Finally, Kansas, echoing the Special Master, presents the most
persuasive arguments concerning the feasibility of some disgorgement
award. Kansas argues that the disgorgement award should be even
greater than the $1.8 million recommended by the Special Master to

192. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987) (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S.
554, 564 (1983)).
193. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979)).
194. Grant Harse, Nebraska’s Costs of Compliance with the Republican River Compact: An
Equitable Solution, 19 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 124, 146 (2009).
195. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 134 (1987).
196. Harse, supra note 194, at 145.
197. Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
198. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (quoting Cavanaugh v.
Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919)).
199. Nebraska’s Exceptions and Brief in Support, supra note 10, at 2.
200. See Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 111 (reporting that Nebraska’s ground water
pumping fell from more than 1,400,000 acre-feet in 2002 to less than 900,000 acre-feet in 2006).
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201

effectively serve its deterrent function. Nebraska and Colorado
202
203
oppose the award, arguing that the award is unprecedented. The
Court, however, has plenary power to institute a solution that it
204
deems fair and equitable.
Nebraska also tries to argue that disgorgement is not warranted
205
because it did not knowingly breach.
While Nebraska may have
taken some efforts to avoid breach, its breach was inevitable.
Nebraska, while making efforts to reduce its water consumption,
overused its allowance from 2003 through 2005, so that vast under206
usage would have been required in 2006 for compliance.
Despite the feasibility of some disgorgement award, Colorado
argues that the Special Master’s specific award of $1.8 million was
207
arbitrary, and thus not proper. The Court may be persuaded to
depart from the Special Master’s recommendation on this issue. The
Special Master failed to set specific parameters for his calculation,
merely citing that the $1.8 million “represents a disgorgement of the
208
amount by which Nebraska’s gain exceeds Kansas’s loss.” Further,
while Kansas claims economic loss from Nebraska’s breach, some
209
commentators argue that Kansas in fact suffered no harm. While
Kansas’s claimed losses remain speculative, Nebraska has already
expended many resources in complying with the Compact’s
210
requirements. Again, the Court must reach a fair and equitable
211
solution, which does not include a damages award chosen at
random. While the Court may find that some disgorgement is not
arbitrary, in the interest of fairness and equity it will probably require
greater justification for the ultimate award.

201. Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Exceptions, supra note 132, at 53.
202. Nebraska’s Exceptions and Brief in Support, supra note 10, at 10; Colorado’s
Exception and Brief in Support, supra note 167, at 4.
203. Nebraska’s Exceptions and Brief in Support, supra note 10, at 9.
204. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 134 (1987).
205. Colorado’s Exception and Brief in Support, supra note 167, at 4.
206. Brief of the United States, supra note 12, at 8.
207. Colorado’s Exception and Brief in Support, supra note 167, at 9.
208. Fourth Report, supra note 6, at 179.
209. Harse, supra note 194, at 146–47 (citing Editorial, River Details Preliminary
Republican River Decisions Seem to Lean to Nebraska, Omaha World-Herald, Dec. 18, 2008, at
06B).
210. Id. at 147.
211. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 134 (1987).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Cases of original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, such as
Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado, reach as far back as the
Constitution’s enactment. In this context, the Court plays a vital role
as referee between the sovereign States. Ultimately, the Court’s goal is
to reach fair and equitable solutions. Here, the Court can achieve this
goal by reforming the mutual mistake in the FSS’s accounting
procedures. Currently, the accounting procedures include imported
water as part of the virgin-water calculation, despite the Compact’s
plain language and clear intent stating otherwise. Additionally, the
Court would create injustice by denying reformation, thereby
approving a system that charges one state more than it uses. Finally,
the Court may include a disgorgement award as part of its equitable
relief of a knowing breach. The Court, however, must be careful to
impose only damages that it can substantiate; otherwise fairness is not
attained. Fair and equitable relief will produce goodwill between the
States, which is of paramount concern because they are bound
together indefinitely.

